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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In reoent years the Amerioan people have heard and read a 
great deal about congressional investigating committees, their 
powers and their methods. Of the great number of senators and 
congressmen who have served on tbese commIttees at one time or 
another, perhaps none bas enjoyed more publIcity than the con-
troversial gentleman from Wisconsin, Senator Joseph R. McOarthy. 
His name is mentioned here because throughout the numerous probes 
he directed until his censure by the United states Senate, he wes 
frequently on the receiving end of that power of the President ot 
the United states with which we are here concerned, the power to 
withhold information from Congress. One recent instance of such 
a refusal of information oocurred in Kay, 1954, during the Army-
McCarthy hearings. In the oourse of his testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations, ~ Counselor John 
Adems told of a meeting which had taken place several months 
earlier between oertain top ottieials ot the Bisenhower Adminis-
tr~tion. When asked tor fUrther details of this oonference, 
Adams refused to answer. His position was supported and 
1 
• 
2 
clarified a few days later when the President issued a directive 
. 
to the Secretary of Defense, forbidding all employees of the 
Defense Department appearing before the Senate Committee on 
Government Operations to testify o~ncerning conversations or 
communications exchanged within the Executive Department on 
official matters. Deeply chagrined, Senator MoCarthy called for 
a recess to consider nthis unbelievable situation ... l 
UnDelievable or not, the case is but one of many cases of a 
similar nature which have occurred during the Roosevelt, Truman, 
and Eisenhower administrations. By what right, we could ask, may 
the President of the United states withhold information from 
Congress, even when his a.ction seems to be a hindrance to a val-
uable and worthwhile function of the legislative body? In other 
words, what is the origin of this power? To answer this question 
will be the first aim of this thesis. 
The problem at hand begins to take on substance when we 
recall that nowhere in the United states Constitution is there 
explicit mention or acknowledgment of this presidential power 
as such. Further, in the one hundred and sixty-four years that 
have elapsed since the origin of the power, and in the one hundred 
and sixty since it was first exerCised, no statute dealing with 
such a power has ever been passed. And while there have been a 
fair number of court cases which dealt with congressional powers 
ITime Magazine, May 24, 1954, 26. 
L 
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of inquiry, t~e presidential power to withhold information has 
never been the subjeot of a Supreme Court deoision. 
What then is the origin of this power? History tells us 
that the first president to withhold information from Congress 
was George Washington. It would be natural to suspect then that 
Washington played an important part in determining the nature and 
extent of the power, as well as the conditions required for its 
invocation. As will be seen later such was the case. Nevertheles 
one might still ask by what authorlty our first president estab-
lished this power. The answer In Washington's own words ls: 
" ••• as 1t 1s essential to the due administration of the Gov-
ernment that the boundaries fixed by the Constitut10n between 
the ditterent departments should be preserved, a just regard to 
the Oonstitution and to the duty ot my offioe, under all the 
circumstances of this case, forbids a complianoe with your 
request. "2 
The dootrine of separation of powers whioh establishes the 
general independence ot the Executive, Legislative, and JudiCial 
Branches of our government, was olearly Washington's justifica-
tion ot his refusal. It is not the purpose of this thesis to 
oonsider the dootrine of separation ot powers, Whioh is the 
remote foundation ot the President's prerogative in refusing 
2MesSGses and Papers of the Presidents, ad. James D. 
Riohardson, {NeW-York; l891T,-r; l88. 
L 
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information to Congress. Rather its aim will be to determine the 
. 
proximate origin of this power, and from an examination of the de-
tails of Washington's procedure in 1792 and 1796, to learn some-
thing of the nature of the power as it existed at the time ot its 
institution. 
It was mentioned that the power to withhold information is 
not explicitly established in the Constitution, nor in an posi-
tive statute. What then is the torce of this power? When the 
president exercises his right to withhold information, he acts 
in accordanoe with his own interpretation of the Constitution. 
Thus Washington acted, and such has been the procedure ot all 
later presidents having recourse to the power. However, there is 
this considerable ditterence in the actions ot later presidents, 
that they have had behind them the weight ot historical precedent. 
American history abounds in the number ot instances in which 
information has been withheld by the president or by heads ot 
departments. It would, therefore, have been a ter easier matter 
to force President Monroe to back down on his retusal in 1825, 
either through the threat ot impeaohment or by weight ot public 
opinion, than it would be today. In a word, the power, although 
not enjoying the force ot law, has OOMe to be regarded as a 
custom. "A custom is the result or a long series of actions, 
constantly repeated, which have, by such repetition, and by 
5 
uninterrupted ~cquiescence, acquired the force ot a tacit and 
common consent. "3 
It is true that the general principle established by Wash-
Ington in 1792, that information might be withheld whenever com-
plianoe with a congressional request would prove incompatible 
with the public intereat, admits of nUlllerous interpretations. 
Moreover, at least in theory, any president has as much right to 
apply the power acoording to this norm as Washington did, and 
would have the right to 80 interpret the Constitution regardless 
of historical preoedent. Yet, the fact remains that the president 
toda, would be much more reluctant to apply the power,-were it not 
for the numerous historical precedents that have intervened since 
its origin, for there would exist a much greater chance ot incur-
ring the wrath of Congress and of the people, without such prece-
dents. The number of thea. precedents over the years has enor-
mously increased the strength and stability ot the power. The 
many innovations introduced in its application to new situations 
have considerably broadened the nature and extent of the power, 
L 
If not in theory, then at least, and much more important, in 
tact. And the number ot precedents issuing from each new inno-
vation has increased the force ot the power in each of those 
distinct and separate types ot application. It is for this reason 
.laenry Campbell Black, Black t s ~ Dictionary, 3rd ed., 
(st. Faul, 1933), 494. 
.. 
I that the I.cond aia ot this the.ia will be • thorough review :nd 
, 
examination of the many historical cases in which the President ot 
the United states has withheld information from Congress. The pur-
pose of this examination will be to determine the historical devel-
opment of the power, to the end that a greater understanding might 
be had ot its nature and extent as it exists in practIce today~ 
L 
The third question whioh might be asked, and whiph oertainly 
can only be answered through a study ot this kind, is what are the 
advantages and disadvantages of the power as it exists today. This 
of course oomes down simply to an inquiry into the advantages and 
disadvantages whioh have tollowed from historical uaages ot the 
, 
power. For example, what adVantage, it any, oan be tound in the 
power when retusal obviously hampers Oongress in its work ot remov-
ing subversive elements from the government? It will also be ot 
value to try to determine whether the power has ever been abused, 
although this is admittedly the moat diftioult feature of our 
investigation. 
Other than the briet and soattered aocounts of various oases 
to be found in biographies of presidents, there has been no 
thorough and conneoted investigation of this subject. This treat-
ment, therefore, will be unique for the thoroughness of investiga-
tion it will give to the subject, as well as for its evaluation of 
the development and present so ope of the power as established by 
historioal preoedent. 
1 
The best ~ource material was found to be such primary sources 
as the Annals 2! Congress, and its successors, the Congressional 
Globe and Congressional Reoord. Letters of the various presidents 
proved to be invaluable also. Secondary source materials, such 
as biographies of presidents and works dealing with particular 
periods, were more or less helpful, depending on whether the cases 
to be considered had other important historioal implications. 
There are a tew studies ot the congressional investigative power 
whioh were moderately helpful. 
A word of oaution seems in order at this point. This thesis 
does not attempt any sort ot investigation into the legal aspects 
ot the problem. Nor will any theorizing be done on an alternate 
method of institution whioh early presidents might have followed, 
or on how it might now be amended. This is exclusively an 
historical treatment of the subject, dealing with precedents 
recorded in history and with the historical background of those 
precedents. All the conolusions of the thesis will be based 
801ely upon historical evidence. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ORIGIN OF THE POWER 
The President t • power to withhold information from Congress 
was clearl 7 established b7 President George Washington in two 
cases which arose during his administration. In the first ot 
these case •• concerning the infamous st. Clair expedition. al-
though the conditions for the precedent were methodical17 set down, 
no information was actually refused. The first instance of a Pres-
ident exerCising the power did not come until four years later at 
the close of Washington's second term of oftice. These two cases 
make up the subjeot matter 01' this chapter. 
In the latter part of the summer ot 1790, Major General Arthur 
st. Clair, Governor 01' the Northwest Territory, met with President 
Washington in New York, to discuss the impending frontier campaign. 
Aware 01' st. Clair's lack ot experience in the type ot wartare 
carried on in the wilderness, the President was careful to warn 
the General to be ever on his guard against the possibility ot 
a surprise attack. st. Clair proposed the establishment of a 
military post at a so-called "Miami Village," near present-da7 
Fort Wayne, Indiana, and he was ordered to proceed to Miami with 
a force 01' two thousand men composed of regulars and militia. By 
8 
the autumn ot 1791, it was assumed that these o~ders were in 
process of exe~ution.l 
On December 9, 1791, word ~eached the rresident that St. 
9 
Clair's expedition had sustained a tragic and ignominious deteat. 
Attacked by the Indians near the Miami Village, the army had thro 
away its weapons and tled in paniC, leaving all its cannon and muc 
other equipment behind them. Discipline was not restored to the 
fleeing remnants until they were many ml1es from the scene ot the 
disaster, and when invento17 was: tinally taken, the total casual-
ties numbered more than nine hundred. It was, says Freeman, the 
most ghastly s.nd huml1iating experience ot the white man in Indian 
wartare ainoe Braddock's deteat. 2 
Feeling ran high ameng ottioials ot the Government and the 
people as well. On December 12, Washington sent to both house. 
of Congress an ofticial report of the event, promising a further 
communioation of all information neoessary tor the Legislature 
to judge what measur •• should be taken to meet the situation. st. 
Clair's personal report ot the event was sent, complete and exaotly 
as reo.i •• d.) 
1 Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, (New York, 
1954), VI, )29. 
2~., 336-339. 
3~., 339. 
> 
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Nevertheless, these and other reports sent to Congress during 
the following months were evidently not suffioient in the ey •• ot 
oertaln legi.latora. A resolution was brought up in the Hou.e ot 
Representatlves proposing that the President should be oalled upon 
to institute an inquiry. In the debate whioh tollowed, tbi. me.amw 
met with widespread opposition on the part ot many who felt that 
to phrase the ROtton in such a way was to imply a certain remisa-
ness in the President'. performance ot his duty, a tact which, to 
aay ,the least, was by no meana certain. On March 27 this first 
resolution was rejected, and in it. place another was passed which 
stated: "Resolved, That a oommltte. be appointed to Inquire into 
the cause. of the fallure ot the late expedition under ~~Jor 
General st. Clair; and that tbe said co_ittee be empowered to 
oall for such persons, papera, and record., a. may be nece •• arf to 
assist their lnqull"l ••• "4 
Immedlately a request va. sent to SecretaPY ot War Knox tor 
all the papers and letters, Includlng Washlngton's orlginal In-
structiona, connected wlth the st. Clalr expedltion, and Knox in 
tvn lald the matter betore the i'resldent top hls approval. On 
March 31 Washington oalled a meeting ot his oabinet, consisting ot 
Hamilton, Knox, Jetferson, and Randolph. He told them that he dld 
not 1n any way question the propl"iety of the House'a procodure. 
-
4Annals ot oonlress, 2nd Oongress, 1st Sess10n, (Washington, 
1849), Ill, 4qo-~4. 
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However, he telt that 1n as much as this was the tirst example of 
such a request tor intormation and would, therefore, serve as a 
precedent tor subsequent cases ot a similar nature, he was anxious 
that it be hs.ndled thoughtfully and correctl,._ On April 2 the 
Cabinet again met on the same subject. Says Jetferson of the 
meeting: 
I'We were ot one mind. (1). that the House was an inquest, 
and theretore might institute inqUiries. (2). that they 
might call for papers generally. (3). that the Executive 
ought to communicate such papers as the public good would 
permit, and ought to retuse those the disclosures of which 
would injure the public. Consequently were to exeroise a 
disoretion. (4). that neither the commee nor House had a 
right to oall on the head of a deptmt, who and whose papers 
were under the Presidt. alone, but that the oommee should 
instruct th~ir chairman to move the house to address the 
President.";' 
With this matter ot principle decided, Washington had no desire 
to withhold any informat10n trom the House, and accordingly he 
wrote to the Seoretary of War on April 4, directing him to 
forward to the House all papers requested by their resolution. 6 
The only dis.enter trom this op1nion was Hamilton, who agreed 
on all po1nts except the last, that concern1ng the House's power 
to call on heads ot departments. He recognized that his own post 
ot Secretary ot the Treasury was certainly subject to Congress on 
lome points, as evidenced b,. the acts which created that office. 
"Thomas Jetterson, tiThe Anas," Writings, ed. P. L. Ford, 
Federal edition, (New York, 1904), It, ~13-!4. 
6George Washington, Writings, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 
(Washington, 1939), XXXII, l~. . 
b 
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Nevertheless, he still did not feel obliged to produce any and 
every paper Congress might request. Jefferson tells us ot this 
opinion of Hamilton and adds that he thought Hamilton preferred 
the question to remain vague, so that he might be able to subject 
himself either to Congress or to the President according to his 
own pleasure. 7 
The report of the select committee ot the House on May 8, 
1792 exonerated General st. Clair of all blame. Consideration ot 
this committee's report waa then referred to another oommittee 
whose report was completed too late tor discuasion in the 1st 
Session. When Congress reconvened in the tall ot 1792 the matter 
was taken up anew. A debate took place in which it was moved to 
demand the attendance ot the Seoretaries ot War and the Treasury 
on the House. Yet many members of the House opposed this motion, 
some simply because they oould see no point to it; others, be-
oause they did not think the House had the power to demand the 
presenoe of the oftioials in question. Consequently, on November 
14. an alternate resolution was passed merely calling tor informa-
tion, not damanding the attendance ot the department heads. Al-
though Secretary Knox did subsequently appea.r before the committe" 
his appearance seems to have been entirel, voluntary.8 
7Jetterson, Writings, II, 214. 
8Annnals ~ Congress, 2nd Cong, 2nd S~ss, 679-89. 
13 
The st. Clair Case is an important one in American history. 
Not only was it the first time a Congressional committee was ap-
pointed to investigate a matter involving the Executive branoh ot 
the Government, it was also the first Congres8ional request 
formation trom the Executive. The House based its right to inves-
tigate on its oontrol over publio expenditure8 and appropriations. 
Thus, although the House reoeived the fullest cooperation fro 
the Fresident in the St-. Clair ease, and although no information 
was refused, the certain oonditions tor future refusals of infor-
mation were nonetheless clearly established, even pertaining to 
department heads. 
The second Washington ease, and the first in which informa-
tion was refused to Congress, oonoerned Jay's Treaty ot 1794 with 
Great Britain. War had broken out between Great Britain and 
France in 1793, pro.ising 8 profitable trade in wheat for the 
United States with both belligerent nations. Amerioan hopes were 
ot short duration, however, for almost immediately Britain began 
to seize all neutral vesaels trading with the Frenoh West Indies. 
This served to heighten the triotion already existing with the 
English over the retusal ot American oitizens to pay their debts 
to English creditors, outstanding since the Revolution, together 
with British reluotance to surrender their trading posts in the 
Northwest Territory. 
-
9W• B. Binkley. The Povers 2! !h! President, (Garden City 
1937), 39-40. ---
14 
As the United states was not prepared tor a war, President 
. 
Washington, in spite of certain dubious treaty obligations to 
France, issued a proclamation of neutrality_ He then sent Chief 
Justice John Jay to ~ngland to work out a treaty covering the 
ifarious points disputed by the two nations. America was clearly 
~n no position to bargain, as the treaty clearly demonstrated. To 
~reat Britain went the right of free naVigation and trading on the 
~ississippi, the payment of all outstanding American debt., and the 
~reedomot all American ports to British vessels. Of the key 
lssue,t~e impressment ot United states seamen, nothing was said. 
Public opinion was bitter against Washington, Hamilton and 
Jay. Jefferson, the leader of the Republicans, had already re-
signed aa Seoretary of State, and he opposed the treaty when he 
realized that it would be a good issue on which to unify his party. 
~e treaty was submitted to the Senate, debated in secret for two 
~eeks, and then approved. President Washington signed it on 
~ugust 12, 1795.10 
One tact which should be kept in mind is that over this 
ant ire episode there hangs the pall ot party politics. The 
Republicans were tradit10nally pro-French, and called the treaty 
'the MOst hum11iating contract into which America has ever 
~ntered."11 Ratification had been secured, but it was soon clear 
10C8rl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1943), 78-79. 
llAlbert J. Beveridge, The Lire of John Marahall, (Boston, 
~919), II, 114. - -
-15 
that the Repub.licans he.d not yet begun to f'ight. The etf'ective-
ness of the treaty depended upon the appropriation of government 
funds, an appropriation which could be voted only by the Republi-
can dominated House of Representatives. The controversy finally 
boiled over in the form of' a resolution proposed in the House on 
March 2, 1796, by Edward Livingston of' New YOl"'k. The measure 
stated: "Resolved. That the President 01' the United states be re-
quested to lay before this House a copy of the instructions to the 
Ministel'" of the United States who negotiated the treaty with Great 
Britain, communicated by his message of the first ot March, 
together with the correspondenoe and other doouments relative to 
the said treaty.n12 
In the debate which rolloved, Livingston was asked whether 
the purpose of securing these papers was to contest the con-
stitutionality of' the treaty or to bring about the impeachment of 
Washington or Jay. He answered that this remained to be seen and 
that the main reason tor the call was that the House might be able 
to deoide whether it would sanction the treaty or not. The Fed-
eralists replied that the treaty was conducted in perfeot accord 
with the Constitution, and they pointedly observed that aooording 
to the.t same Constitution the House had absolutely no share in the 
treaty-making power.13 
I2Arinals 2! Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, 426. 
13I bid., 42&0-29. 
-
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This sanctioning of the treaty to which Livingston referred 
was simply the voting of the appropriations necessary for carrying 
the treaty into etfect. The Republicans claimed that the House 
could hardly be expected to vote intelligently on the matter with-
out access to the requested papers and information. They were 
willing to admit the President·s constitutional right to refUse 
this information, and on March 7, 'an amendment was inserted into 
the resolution .0 8S to except "such ot the said papers as any 
existing negotiations may render improper to be disolosed.«14 
At this point the issue of the debate underwent a Change 
from the original question ot whether intormation should be re-
quested of the President, to whether the House enjoyed a share in 
the treaty-making power at all. For three weeks the debate 
rambled on. James Madison and Albert Gallatin were the principal 
spokesmen for the Republicans, and Madisonts arguments were partic 
ularly cogent and to the point. The gist of his rather lengthy 
speech was that sinoe treaties have the force ot law, the House 
could not be a part of the law-making power of the government and 
ret be excluded trom the treatr-making power, tor suoh an exolusio 
would be to reduce it to a purely ministerial agency, an instru-
mental arm at the Exeoutive and the Senate. Then too, he said the 
the House could not be expeoted to appropriate ~lnds without de-
l1beration on the SUbject. The treaty was utterly dependent for 
14Ibid., 429-38 • 
........... 
17 
its efficacy, at least in this case, on the appropriation ot 
. 
funds by the House, and this was an argument both tor the House's 
right to the desired papers, as well as tor the contention that 
it shared in the treat~-making power. 15 
It was March 24 before the House finally returned to the 
original question of the request for information. Livingston's 
amended .. resolution requesting the papers was put to a vote and 
passed, sixty-two to thirty-seven. l6 
The Federalists argued the matter during the following week, 
suggesting that the desired papers had already been given to the 
Senate and were at that moment on tile in the same building in 
which they all sat. Therefore, they pleaded, why debate for 
eighteen days over papers which could have been obtained in as 
many hours1l7 
On March 25 the President replied to the House that "he 
would take the request of the House into·consideration. tf18 He 
then wrote to his cabinet meMbers as tollows: 
Sir: The Resolution moved in the House ot Represen-
tatives, for the papers relative to the negotiation ot 
the Treaty with G. Britain having passed in the affirma-
tive, I request your opinion, 
15Ibid., 487-95. 
-16~., 759. 
11 Ibid., 191. 
-
18Washington, writings, XXXIV, 505. 
18 
Whether that bbancb or Conp-e.a hath, or hath not 
a right, 'by the Constitution, to call for thoae papers? 
whether, it it doe. not posseS8 the right, it 
would be expedient under the clrculI1stances ot this 
partioular oas8, to furnish them? 
And, 1n either case, in what terms would it be 
most proper to comply w1th, or to retus. the re-
quest of the House? 
These opinIons in writing, and your fttendance, 
will b. expected at ten o'clock tomorrow. 9 
The cabinet was unanimously opposed to compliance with the reso-
lution ot the House. On March 30, WashingSon, following the •• 
opinions" and especIally that ot Uamilton,20 Jteplied to the 
House in a tone at onOe courteous but unyield1ng: 
I trust that no part ot mJ oonduct has ever ind1cated 
a disposItion to withhold any inforll1ation which the Con-
stitution has enjoined upon the President as a duty to 
give, or which could be required ot him by either Houae 
of Congress as a right; and with truth I affirm that 1t 
has been, as it will oontinue to be while I have the 
honor to preside in the Government, mJ oonstant endeavor 
to harmonize with the other branohe. thereot 80 far a8 
the trust delegated to me b1 the people of tbe United 
Stat •• and ., sen.e or the obligation it imposes to 
flpre.erl!' proteot, and defend the Constitution" will 
permit. 
He pointed out rurther that the "nature ot foreign negotia-
tions requires caution, and their success must orten depend on 
8ecrecy; • 
• • To 6ldmit, then, a ri~~t 1n the Bouse ot Represen-
tat1ves to demand and to have as a metter ot course all the 
papers respecting a negot1ation w1th a fore1gn power would be to 
191b1d. 
20 Jobn S. Bassett, !2! Federalist Szatem, (New York, 1901), 
II, 134. 
~re8ident., ed. James D. Rioh-
r 
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establish a dangerous precedent." He reminded the House that 
. 
careful examination of the Constitution, the journals and 
proceedings of the Federal Convention, and ot the state ratify-
ing conventiona, proved conclusively that the House was .definitely 
not intended to share in the treaty-making power of the govern-
ment. As for the Senate, whioh does share in this power, Wash-
ington again stressed the point that no information whatsoever 
had been retused to that body at the time ot its delIberation 
on the treaty. FUrthermore, he said that sinoe the House had 
no share in the treaty-making power, the only other purpose 
whioh it seemed it could have had in its request was impeachment. 
and that had not been specified in the resolution. He concluded: 
As, therefore, it is perfeotly clear to my under-
standing that the assent of the House of Represen-
tatives is not necessary to the validity ot a treaty; 
as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits in itselt 
all the objects requiring legislative prOVision, and 
on these the papers called tor oan throw no light, 
and as it i8 essential to the due administration ot 
the Government that the boundaries fixed by the 
Constitution between the difterent departments should 
be preserved, a just regard to the Constitution and 
to the duty ot my ottice, under all the cirCUMstances 
of this case, forbid. a complianoe with your request. 
Needless to say, the House Republicans were indignant at 
this blunt refusal. wrote Madison to Monroe: "I have no doubt 
that the advice, and even the message itselt, were oontrived in 
New York, where it was seen that if the rising torce of the Re-
publicans was not crushed, it must speedily crush the British 
party, and that the only hope ot success lay in tavoring an open 
r_-------------------. 
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rupture with t?e President. ft22 On April 6 Representative Thomas 
Blount proposed a resolution stating that even though the House 
bad no share in the treaty-making power, in a oas8 such as this 
in whioh the treaty concerned a matter subject to House control, 
tbe House had not only a right, but even an obligation to de-
liberate on carrying the treaty into e£fect. The resolution waa 
passed on the following day by a vote ot fifty-seven to thirty-
tlve. 23 Another resolution was also passed on April 7, the same 
day, in which the House denied the necessity of stating the pur-
pose of its call tor information, when such information waa needed 
for the constitutional operations of the Houae.24 
The situation was indeed serious by this time. Prom Senator 
Rufus King of New York came the blunt announcement that unless 
the House made the necessary appropriations, the Senate would 
consider alL legislation at an end and the Union disso1ved.25 
Similarly, the Federalist Press threatened that they would see 
the dissolution of the Union betore allowing the rejeotion ot 
Jay's Treaty to preoipitate a war with England. Seoretary ot the 
Treasury Hamilton secured counter-resolutions from many of the 
22Lettera and Other Writinss ot James Madison, FOurth Presi-
Ident 2! the UnItid states, (Sew York, 1884), II, 97. 
23Annals !! Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, 772-73. 
24Ibid., 782-83. 
-I~. 25Claude Bowers, Jefferson end Hamilton, (Boston, 1925), ~98-99. -
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~erchants in ~is home state of New York who stood to Burrer from 
8 rejection of the treaty. Pinally, a plan was devised by the 
Federalists to have the Senate attaoh Jay's Treaty 8S a rider to 
three other treaties with Spain, Algiers, and the Indians. all of 
~hich were up for consideration at that time. It was hoped that 
the House would then be forced to yield in order to secure the 
senate's ratification of these three other treaties. However, 
~hismaneuver tailed when the House RepublIcans managed to out-
lVote the Federalists on the first three trea.tIes before the treaty 
with Great Britain came up_ It is interesting to note, s81s 
achaohner, that the Federalists dId not attempt to defend the 
~reaty, but concentrated their attaok on the faot that the House 
~ad no right to examine the treaty at 811. 26 
'rhe next tew weeks were crucial. John Adams writing on 
April 19 speaks of the dangers of war or dissolution of the Union 
~t the House should refuse to make the necessary appropriations. 
~I cannot deny." he said, nthe right of the House to ask for 
papers, nor to express their opinions upon the merits ot a trea.ty. 
~ ideas are very high of the rights and powers of the House ot 
~.presentatives. These powers may be abused, and in this instance 
~here 1s great danger that they will be. • • • But the faith and 
~onor ot the nation are pledged, and though the House cannot 
~I 26Nathan Schachner, The Foundins Fathers, (New York, 1954), 
~91-93. ---
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approve, they pught to teel themselves bound. Some persons still 
think the Bouse will oomply.tt21 
On April 15 debate on the treaty began onoe more in the 
committee of the whole. The turning point oame on April 28 with 
• 
the famoQs tlTomahawk Speeoh" ot Representative Fisher Ames. Al-
though only thirty-eight years old, Ames was in very poor health, 
and his speeoh on this oocasion almost cost him his lite. Bis 
eloqueno. in stressing the vital necessity ot avoiding war and 
preserving the nation at any honorable cost turned the tide ot 
opposition.28 A vote ot fifty to torty-nine sent the matter trom 
the committee of the whole to the Houae, and on April 30, by a 
vote ot .fifty-one to torty-eight, legislation making the neo-
essary appropriations 1n support ot the treaty was enacted by the 
House, "exercising its recpgnized oonstitutional freedom ot 
judgement. ft29 
Although the question ot the Bouse's power with regard to 
treaties has continued through the years to be a tavorite sub-
ject ot debate, there was not muoh that oould be said on the 
President's retusal ot information. This seoond case, unlike the 
one ot tour years previous, was not Just a simple statement of 
21Lettera of John Adams Addressed to His Wite, ed. Charles 
~ancis Adams, TBoston, 1841), II, 222-~.---
28Great Debates in American Historz. ed. Marion M. Miller, 
(lew York, 191), ll,-rart I, 51-56. 
29Annals 2! Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, 1291 
-
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principle, bu~ an abrupt retusal, and it could not be expected 
to sit w;ell with the congressional house in question. Moreover, 
there was clearly present an element ot party politics, and this 
rendered the contro~.rsy even more bitter. The argument advanced 
by the House Republicans that they were entitled to information 
concerning any appropriation they were expected to make, was a 
good one in those early days, and remains so even today., Never-
theless, Washington's detense ot his action 1n w1thholding the 
papers called tor by the House definitely carried the day. 
Whether,;the House should have a share in the treaty-making power 
is an interesting question, worthy ot much oonsideration and 
perhaps even ot a oonstitutional amendment. Yet as Washington 
pointed out in his letter of refusal, the plain faot is that the 
Constitution did not at tQat time (nor does it today) include 
the House in that power. Inasmuch al it was the oontention ot 
those Republicans demanding the information that the House did 
possess such power over treaties, surrender of the information 
would have been tantamount to admitting they were correot about 
the treaty power. With this taot in mind it is eaey to under-
.tand those words of the President: " ••• it is essential to the 
due administration of the Government that the boundaries fixed by 
the Constitution between the different departments be preserved.n)O 
-
30Richardson, Messages ~ Papers 2!. ~ Presidents, I, 188. 
-
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frotection of. the oonstitutional separation of powers demanded 
a refusal of the information. 
This was not the only reason for the President's refusal. 
Even had the House not put forth such a bold interpretation of 
the extent of its powers, but merely requested the information, 
the President would have refused any~al, in order to preserve 
the secrecy so essential to the negotiation of a treaty with a 
foreign power. The House itself recognized this in the amend-
ment which was passed to Livingston's resolution, excluding 
"SUCh of the said papers as any existing negotiations may render 
improper to be disclosed.")l 
Thus did the House itselt recognize the constitutional right 
of the President to refuse the information should he choose to 
do so; thus did the President make the publio interest his norm 
of action, for it MUst be in the public interest to protect the 
powers of the Executive from encroachment by another bra.nch of 
the government, and to proteot the principle of treaty-secrecy; 
and thus was the precedent, outlined tour years before, firmly 
establlshed. 32 
3lAnnals ~ Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, 438. 
32 (The best treatment of Washington's second case i. 
McMaster, Historz of the People of the United states" II, 267-281; 
Swisher, AmerIcan ainitrtutlonal-oeiiIopment, 78-83; and Schaohne 
~ FoundIng Fathers, 389-393.} 
CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER - I 
Having oonsidered the origin of the power, we turn now to its 
subseque~t development. Th1s ohapter will be devoted exclus1vely 
to oases in whioh the President's refusal was based upon the 
obligation imposed by the Constitution on every Chief Exeout1ve, 
of proteoting his powers against Congressional enoroaohment, while 
the chapter to tollow will deal with other Cases in which the 
reason given for the retusal was ot a more specialized nature. 
Since there are two cases whioh particularly stand out over the 
years as the most vigorous and contested refusals ot information 
to Congress, both designed to protect the President's prerogative, 
both of them will be treated in this ohapter. 
The first of these oases took place in the administration 
of fresident Andrew Jaokson. A really thorough treatment of 
Jacksonts war on the United states Bank would require more spaoe 
than could possibly be allowed here. Nevertheless, certain de-
tails will be mentioned, as they contribute to a tu~ler under-
standing of this case. It is not perfectly olear Just why Jaokson 
opposed the Bank. Was he really convinoed that the institution 
was a menace to the lower olasses? Or was it merely a political 
2$ 
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issue, on whieb he meant to capitalize to ino~ease his following? 
As a matter of tact, the ~eal reason was p~obably 8 very complex 
combination of these and other reasons. At any rate, when in 
July, 18)2, the bill for rechartering the Bank Came before the 
president, Jackson vetoed it. When later that same year he was 
re-elected to the Presidency after so much public discussion ot 
his veto, he considered his aotion gloriously vindicated. And so 
the administration set out once and fo~ all to dest~oy the 
"Nobility System" and its head, the United States Bank. l 
Although the Bank cha~te~ was not due to expire for anothe~ 
three years, Jackson was determined to kill the institution as 
soon as possible. The charte~ made the Bank the depository ot 
federal funds, unless the See~etary ot the Treasury should order 
otherwise. Accordingly, the President decided to remove these 
funds trom the Bank. Because Secretary of the Treasury McLane 
would have nothing to do with the move, he was promoted to the 
state Department, and his position in the Treasury Department 
was tilled by William J. Duane, a Philadelphia lawyer who had 
signed the antll'Bank report in 1829. This was the plan proposed 
by Attorney-General Taney, who believed that while Congress itselt' 
2 
could not oontrol tederal funds, the Secretary could. 
lArthur M. Sohlesinger, Jr., !a! Age 2! Jackson, (Boston, 
1945), 89-97. 
2Binkley, The Powers of the President, 77. 
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But the Secretary would not. Duane certainly must have known 
what was expected of him when he took the position, yet he managed 
to evade the issue, neither aocepting nor opposing the President's 
point of .viewa On September 14, 1933, Jackson finally suggested 
to Duane that he resign, but to everyone's surprise, he retused. 
When on the eighteenth Jaokson read a paper to his cabinet, a 
fiery denunciation of the Bank, and Duane continued in his refusal 
to remove either the funds or himself, the exasperated President 
simply fired him, and on September 25 appOinted Taney Secretary 
of the Treasury.3 
The Senate was more irritated over this aotion than over the 
original veto. Due to the close relationship that had always 
~reva11ed between Congress and the Treasury Department, they felt 
that their prerogat1ve was being threatened. The duties of the 
~ecretary, they argued, were assigned by Congress, and it was to 
~ongr.ss that he was direoted to report. In other words, Jackson 
~hought the Secretary was subject to the President's orders, 
~hereas the Senate did not.4 
When Congress assembled 1n December, 1833, Henry Clay pro-
posed that an inquiry be made Jor the President, whether a. certain 
~aper reported to have been read at a cabinet meeting and later 
3Schleslnger, ~ Age 2! Jackson, 100-1. 
4S1nkley, Powers 2! ~ President, 78. 
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published was.genuine, h ••• and ir genuine that he be also re-
quested to lay a copy or said paper before the Senate." Some 
objections were made by the Jacksonians, Benton and Forsyth, but 
the measure was swlrtly passed. S 
The paper in question was of course the one Jaokson read to 
his cabinet on September 18, containing his decision to remoYe 
government £Unds from the United States Bank, and listing his 
reasons for this action. The President claimed that the law gave 
full authority to the Secretary, and that Congress' right to 
knowledge was only supposed to be an aid to further legislation. 
This power or the Secretary had been derended in 1817, he said, 
and even though the charter had not yet expired, he felt that 
the removal should be gradual and over a period of time. Various 
reasons were then advanced why the President thought the Bank was 
against the public interest. 6 
It is interesting to conjecture what might have been the 
motives at Henry Clay_ Why, for instanoe, did he insist on 
Jackson's handing over to the Senate a paper which had been pub-
lished in thousands of newspapers allover the United States and 
Europe? This question also occurred to Senators Benton and 
Forsyth, and the latter bluntly asked Clay from the Senate floor 
what the object of the motion was, whether it was not for purposes 
500n~essional Globe, 23rd Congress, 1st Session (Wash-
ington, 1 $), 20-21. 
6Messages and Papers £! ~ Presidents, III, 1224-38. 
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of impeaching. the President? It was one of the rare occasions 
that found the great orator without an answer. Binkley suggeata 
that Clay was simply trying to play up the President·s part in 
the removal as much as possible. 7 This would square with the 
assertion of Marquis James that throughout the whole affair Clay 
was really more concerned with his chances in the eleotion ot 
18)6 than with the tate ot the Bank. 8 
On December 12, the President addressed a toroetul reply to 
the Senate's resolution. The letter read in part: 
The executive is a ooordinate and independent 
branch of the Government equally with the Senate, 
and I have yet to learn under what constitutional 
authority that branch ot the Legislature has a right 
to require ot .e an aooount ot any communioation, either 
verbally or in writing, made to the heads ot Departments 
acting as a Cabinet council. As well might I be required 
to detail to the Senate the tree and priVate oonversa-
tions I have held with those offioers on any subject 
relating to their duties and my own. 
'* .. *' 
Knowing the constitutional rights ot the Senate, 
I ahall be the last man under any oiroumstanoes to 
intertere with them. Knowing those of the Exeoutive, 
I shall at all times endeavor to maintain them agree-
ably to the provisions ot the Constitution and the9 solemn oath I have taken to support and defend it. 
The point at issue then took a false shitt. "It is a 
struggle," said Calhoun, "between the exeoutive and legislative 
7B1nkley, Powers 2! ~ President, 80. 
8Marqu1s James, The Life .ot Andrew Jackson, (New York., 
1938), 6S5. - - -
9Melsages and Papers ~ ~ Presidents, III, 1255. 
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departments ot the Government; a struggle, not in relation to 
the existence of the Bank, but which, Congress or the President, 
should have the power to create a bank, and the consequent con-
trol over the currency ot the country. This is the real ques-
tion."10 or course this was not the real issue at all, but it 
weB an issue on which allot Jackson's enemies could unite, the 
Bank supporters as well as proponents of nullification. The 
Senate tloor and galleries were packed when, on December 26, Clay 
Bounded the ke,-note. "We are," he said, "in the midst of a 
revolution rapidly tending toward a total change of the pure 
republican character of our government, and to the concentration 
of all power in the hands of one man. The powers of Congress 
ere paralyzed, except when exerted in conformity with his will, 
by frequent and extraordinary exercise of the executive veto, 
not anticipated by the rounders of our Constitution and not 
practiced by any predecessors of the present chier magistrate. fl 
The speech, which lasted trom the twenty-sixth to the thirtieth 
of December, ranged from suoh subjeots as the undermining of 
the currency and the tariff to the grave dangers to liberty and 
the Constitution embodied in the person of Andrew Jackson. Clay 
concluded: .t'1'he premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us; 
and it Congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective 
lOaesister of Debates in the United States conareS8, 23rd 
Congress, 1st seiBion, (WashIngton, !834), x, 217-1 • 
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remedy, the t~tal collapse will Boon come on, and we shall die 
- -ignobly die- - bas., mean, and abject slaves, the scorn and 
contempt ot mankind; unpitied, unwept, and unmournedlLfl11 
December 26, the day on whioh he began his. speech, also saw 
Clay propose two resolutions, whioh atter debate, were passed 
early ~he following year. The first one stated: "Resolved that 
the reasons assigned by the Secretary for the removal are un-
satisfaotory and insurticient. tt It was passed on February 5 by 
a vote or twenty-eight to eighteen. The second was a resolution 
censuring the President which stated: "Resolved, that the Presi-
dent in the late executive proceedings in relation to the public 
revenue, has assumed upon himselt authority and power not con-
tarred by the Constitution and the 1awa, but in derogation of 
both."l2 This resolution was passed on March 28, by a vote of 
twenty-s.llc to twenty. 
On April 15 President Jackson countered with a lengthy pro-
test addressed to the Senate. nThe President of the United 
states, thererore, has been by 8 majority ot his constitutional 
triers accused and tound guilty ot an impeachable ottense," said 
Jackson, "but in no part of thls proceeding have the directions 
ot the Conatitution been observed." Of course, it was no aecret 
llIbid., 59-94. 
-
12John S. Baasett. The Life ot Andrew Jackson, (New York, 
1931), 649. - --
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tbat the Hous~ was Jackson's and would never impeach him. The 
senat.'s action in censuring the President was second best to im-
peachment, and the only alternative open to the Senate which had 
not the right to impeach the President, tor it remains to the 
House to institute proceedings against the Ohief Executive, and 
Jackson'. retaliation was merely to point out to the Senate the 
unconstitutionalIty of its action. l ) 
The Senate refused to receive this reprimand of the Presi-
dent, and the censure resolution alone remained on the record. 
This enabled the friends of the President to claim he had been 
condemned without a hearing, and that his protest had been treated 
with contempt. 14 
Of course, the President never banded over the requested 
paper. With the House solidly behind him, there was not a chance 
in the world he would be impeached, and so the worst the Senate 
could do was to refUse to place his protest in the record. On 
Apr!l 4, four resolutions proposed by aepresentative James K. Polk 
were passed in the House, killing the Bank. But the affair was 
tar from being closed. Senator Thoma.s Benton pledged that he would 
not rest until the censure resolutIon was expunged trom the record, 
and he began a campaign to secure that end. Pressure was exerted 
13Messages ~ Papers 2! !h! presidents, III, 1288-1312. 
14Bassett, Andrew Jackson, 650. 
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by the Presi<.\ent and his huge following upon state legislatures, 
which then began to demand the resignatIon of senators who had 
voted for the censure. At last in 1831, with Jackson no longer 
in offIce, the expunging resolution was passed. Not even the 
opposition of Henry Clay, making one of the great speeches ot 
his career, could stop it.l5 
Was Taney justified in remo~ing the deposita? He himself 
certainly thought so. since section sixteen of the Bank oharter 
gave him full discretion to do as he saw fIt, and it would 8~em 
that he was right. He po1nted out that the congressional power 
to orde:r restorat10n of the funds was invalid without the Presi-
dent's consent. Then too, when the Secretary was g1ven power to 
withdraw deposits by Oongress, that body was well aware that the 
President had the power to remove the secretary.l6 
But even if Jackson and Taney were not justified in removing 
the funds from the Bank, the President was undoubtedly justified 
in refusing his cabinet paper of September 18 to the Senate. 
Such an inquiry on the part of 8 Congressman today would be absur 
says Binkl&7. The reason it did not strike them as such in those. 
dars was because people had been accustomed to nearly twenty-five 
yeers of subordination of the Executive to Congress. 17 Jackson's 
l5B1nkley, 
l6Sassett, 
/~:;\ s To W0, / ~~" ,--~, 
Powers of !h! President, 85-88 V l OYOLA ~ \ 
Andrew Jackson, 646-9. UNIVt::RSITY 
17Binkley, Powers· of the President, 80. l../8RAR 
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victory is im~ortant precisely because it was the first time a 
president's refusal had been tounded merely on the protection ot 
the bxecutive's prerogative. As such, there can be no doubt that 
it was tor the public welfare, sinoe protection ot the principles 
ot the Constitution is always tor the public welfare. Conse-
quently, Jackson was tully within the conditions laid down by 
washington tor the exerciae of the power. 
Yet, this case was even more significant because it came at 
a time when the power of Congress was at a peak, and beoause it 
was, to a certain extent, a partisan conflict won by the Presi-
dent. With one exception, the situation which surrounded 
President Andrew Jackson in 1833 is unique in American history, 
a8 far as the refusal of intormation is concerned. That one ex-
ception provides the background tor our second Case. 
A large amount of the credit tor the success ot Andrew 
Jacksonts two administrations must be attributed to his use ot 
the spoils system. The Senate realized this tact, and during 
Jackson's own time sought to share with the Fresident the power 
he enjoyed. But the old general was a bit too cratty as well as 
stronger and more popular, and at length the Senate was torced to 
desist. For one reason or another the presidents following Jaok-
son were weaker, and senatorial encroachment onoe again continued 
along the path it had been pursuing when he entered the White 
House. The olimax ca.me with the Tenure ot Otfice Act of 1867, by 
35 
which the Senate assumed control or all appointments to and re-
movals trom public ortice. Public opinion and protests by the 
president brought about 8 revision in the act two years later, 
which took most or the sting out ot the law. Nevertheless, the 
amendment failed to restore the President's full freedom ot re-
moval, ror it provided that the Executive within thirty days atter 
the commencement or each session nominate persons to till the 
vacancies, Then if the Senate rejected any of these apPointments, 
the President had to make others, and so OD, until an agreement 
was reached. These limitations were tha s~bject ot numerous pro-
testa by Presidents Grant, HaJes. and Garfield, and the law waa 
generally conaidered unconstitutional by most lawyers both in and 
out of the Senate. Yet nothing was done to remove it rrom the 
18 [books. 
When Grover Oleveland took the oath of ortice on March 4, 
1885, his inaugural address lett no doubt ss to the new Presi-
dent.s "appr.ciation of thoae functions whioh by the Constitution 
and laws have been especially assigned to the executive branch ot 
the Government."19 In the interval between his inauguration and 
~he opening of the first session ot Oongress in December, Cleve· 
~and suspended 643 Republican ofticials end appointed the same 
18Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland, The Man and the states-
!!m., (New York, 1923), I, 169-172. - - - -
19Messages !B!! Papers 2! ~ Presidents, X, 1~886. 
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number of loy~l Democrats to fill those vacancies. By tar the 
greater number of officials suspended, said the President, were 
ousted because of "gross and indecent partisan conduct on the part 
of the incumbents." He had in mind the use of government post 
oftices as local party headquarters, e.nd other scheming which went 
on during the election. 20 
When Congress convened in December, Cleveland, in accordance 
with the Tenure of Office Act of 1869, submitted the names of his 
643 Democratic appointees, well within the required thirty day 
limit. Immediately, congressional committees began bombarding 
the President and executive departments with requests for reasons, 
8S well as papers and information on file in the executive depart-
ments relating to the sU8p,~+nsions. Said Cleveland in retrospec t: 
"These requests foreshadowed what the Senatorial construction of 
the law of 1869 might be, and indicated that the Senate, notwith-
standing constitutional limitations, and even in the face ot the 
repeal of statutory provisions giving it the right to pass upon 
suspensions by the President, was still inclined to insist, direct 
11 or indirectly, upon that right. n21 The RepublIcan Senate was 
olearly making an attempt to preserve the power it had held for 
years, despite the fall of the Presidenoy and the House to the 
Democrats. 22 
20Grover Cleveland, Presidential Problems, (New York, 1904), 
39-42. 
2lIbid., 46. 
22Binkley, Powers of the President. 176. 
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Realizin, that the doctrine of separation ot powers was at 
stake, the President directed all department heads to refuse any 
requests for information concerning the suspensions with the 
stereotyped reply that nthe public interest would not thereby be 
promoted," or that 11th. reasons related to purely administrative 
acts. II With regard to the 643 Cleveland appointees to ortice, 
the .President later said that Itall information of any description 
1n the possession of the Executive or in any of the departments, 
which would aid in determining the character and fitness of those 
nominated in place of suspended offiCials, was cheerfully and 
promptly furnished to the Senate or its committees when requeste~ 
However, he felt that it he complied with senatorial requests for 
information concerning the suspensions, he would be failing in his 
duty to defend and protect the Constitution and the office ot 
President. 2.3 
The reaction of the Senate was to delay. It was intimated 
that the Senate would confirm Cleveland's nominations if he would 
merely withdraw his accusations against the suspended otticials. 
Such a course would have been politically unwise in the long run, 
as well as dishonest, and realizing this, the President refused 
even to consider it. And 80 after a lapse of three months, only 
seventeen ot the 643 nominations had been considered, and only 
fifteen confirmed. Cleveland himself was by this time convinced 
23Cleveland, Presidential Problems, 46-8. 
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that the Senate was a.ttempting to lay a t'oundation for the con-
tention that it had a right to control the heads ot executive 
departments even against the President in matters ot' executive 
duty.24 
When it became clear that the strategy of holding up appoint 
mente would not force the President into acknowledging their 
right to control removals, the senatorial majority chose another 
epproach. On July 17, 1885, Cleveland had removed George M. 
Duskin t'rom the post of District Attorney for Southern Alabama, 
and had replaced him with a Democrat, John D. Burnett. On 
December 20. the Senate Judiciary Committee requested all papers 
and information relating to the nomination of Burnett and to the 
removal of Duskin. The Attorney-General replied by granting the 
first request which pertained to the appointment of Burnett, for 
there was no doubt that the Senate had a share in tha.t power. 
However, concerning the Duskin papers. he replied that he had not 
88 yet received any orders from the President directing their 
transmission. 25 Within a t'ew hours of this refusal. the Judiciar 
Committee held a discussion of the question. Senator Vest wrote 
to the President of this meeting: 
24~ •• 49-50 
25Binkley, Powers of the President, 177. 
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Mr •. Edmunds replied that he did not claim the 
right to know the Fresident's reasons for suspension, 
but that committees of Congress had never been refused 
such courtesy by the President, etc. No one of the 
Republican senators present dissented trom this position. 
Mr. Edmunds clearly conceded the point, that the Presi-
dent had the exclusive Constitutional power to make 
removals and suspensions, for reaso~g satisfactory to 
him, without consulting the Senate. 
Despite this opinion the Republican majority was as deter-
mined as ever to force the President to yield to their demand. 
On January 25, 1886, contrary to the best legal opinion, a 
resolution Was passed whioh stated: "Resolved that the Attorney 
General be, and he hereby is direoted to transmit to the Senate 
copies ot all documents and papers tha.t have been tiled in the 
department of justice since the firet day of January, A.D. 1885, 
in relation to the conduct of the Office ot District Attorney of 
the United States for the Southern Distriot ot Alabama."21 With 
the resolution went a defiant ultimatum that the Senate would 
never confirm persons nominated to sucoeed suspended otficials 
unless the reasons tor the suspensions were furnished. Replied 
the Attorney General: ftI am direoted by the President to refuse 
your demand ... 28 
At this point the olash broke wide open. The Senate passed 
another resolution, this time condemning "the refusal of the 
Attorney General under whatever inrluence, to send to the Senate 
-
l 
26McElroy, Grover Oleveland, 116. 
27Cleveland, Presidential Problems, 52. 
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copies of the,papers called for in its resolution of the twenty-
fifth ot January • • • as in violation of his official duty and 
subversive of the principles of Government and good administra-
tion thereof." They declared it was the duty of the Senate to 
"refuse its advice and consent to the proposed removals of 
officers when such papers are denied."29 
Cleveland then drafted a message which he sent to the Sena.te 
on March 1, and in which he assumed full responsibility for the 
Attorney General's refusal. "I do not suppose," he said, denying 
that Congress had any control over executive departments, "that 
'the public offices of the United States' are regulated or con-
trolled in their relations to either House ot Oongress by the 
fact that they were 'created by laws enacted by themselves. til 
As for the papers, to which the Senate claimed it had a right 
because they were of an offiCial nature, the President said: 
They consist of letters and representations addressed 
to the Executive or intended for his inspection; they 
are voluntarily written and presented by private citizens 
who are not in the least instlga.ted thereto by any 
ofticial invitation or at all subject to otticial control. 
While some of them are entitled to Executive considera-
tion, many ot them are so irrelevant, or in the light of 
other facts so worthless, that they have not been given 
the least weight in determining the question to which 
they are supposed to relate. 
Cleveland continued, asking whether these papers were to be oon-
lidered public and offioial simply because they were kept in the 
-
29Cleveland, Presidential Problema, 51. 
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Executive Man~ion or deposited in the Departments. "If the 
presence of these papers in the public offices is a stumbling-
block," said the President ooyly, "in the way of the performance 
of Senatorial duty, it can easily be remedied." He then went on 
to discuss the Tenure of Office Act, and accused the Senate of 
trying to handcuft him as it had Andrew Johnson twenty years 
earlier, and he bluntly declared both the repealed and unrepealed 
parts of that act to be unconstitutional. 30 
Upon receiving the President's message, the chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee said he thought it was the first ~.Jme in the 
nation's history that a Fresident had interfered with the delib-
erations of either house of Congress. Debate on the two reports 
of the comm1ttee and on the Presidentta message continued tor 
two weeks. At last the Senate passed a resolution censuring the 
Attorney General, and by implication the President, by 8 vote of 
thirty-two to twenty-five.)l 
The climax of the whole affa.ir was reached when Cieveland 
delivered a death blow, revealing tha.t Duskin's term had expired 
on Deoember 20, 188" prior to the demand for papers relating to 
his office, and prior to the resolutions and reports of the 
Judiciary Committee and to the debate defending this supposedly 
-
l 
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suspended off~cial. This took all the sting out of the Senate's 
"professed anxiety • • • to guard the interests of an official who 
was suspended from office in July, 1885, and who was still claimed 
'cO be in a state of suspension."32 The only question remaining 
was the confirmation of Burnettts appointment, and as there was 
no reason for displs.cing him, it was quickly made. "0nce again, tI 
says Binkley, "just as in the impeachment of Johnson, there had 
been selected an impossible case on which to test their powers 
over dismissal. Their experience with the Tenure of Office Acts 
was altogether unlucky."33 
Of course, the big viotory came when in December, 1886, 
Senator Hoar, one of the Republicans who had opposed Cleveland, 
introduced in the Senate a measure repealing the Tenure of Office 
Act. The bill was passed with only one Republican dissenting. 34 
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the Republican about~tace was 
. 
their realization of what the Whigs in Jacksonts time had never 
been able to grasp, that the American people s,)emed to regard the 
President more or less as a tribune, and tended to identity them-
selves with the President 1n·his fight against the Legislative 
Branch of the Government. 35 Indicative of this mood of the people 
321.!?!!!., 68 
33Binkley, Powers .2!. s.h!. .President, 181. 
34George F. Hoar, Autobiography, (New York, 1903), II, 143-4. 
35Binkley, Powers 2£ !h! President, 182. 
was the March.ll, 1886 editorial in the Nation which read: "there 
is not the smallest reason for believing that, it the Senate won, 
it would use its victory in any way tor the Maintenance or pro-
motion of reform. In truth, in the very midst of the controversy, 
it confirmed the nomination of one of Baltimore's political 
Bcamps.n36 In addition to public opinion there were certain other 
factors which influenced the Senatets capitulation. The Presi-
dent's strong and irrefUtable message, the revelation about Duski~ 
the fact that many Republicans sincerely felt the President was 
right, all these contributed to the change in the position of the 
Senatorial majority. Then too, many RepubliCans had apprOached 
the President with requests to depose members of their own party 
from office, end they now feared that the President might make 
this publiC, as well a8 the evidence supplied by them. 37 
This was one of Grover Cleveland's greatest constitutional 
victories. Rarely since the days of Andrew Jackson had a pres-
ident stood up to the Senate so fearlessly and successfully. In-
deed, there are a number of similarities between this case and 
Jacksonts war against the Bank in 1833-34. Both involved con-
tlicts between a DemocratiC President and an opposition Senate; 
~oth occurred after a long period of Senatorial dominance in the 
36Henry J. Ford, ~ Cleveland Era, (New Haven, 1921), 74. 
~. 37A11an Nevins, Grover Cleveland, ! study !rr Courage, (New 
~oPk. 1932), 263. 
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government; bo.th resulted in victories for the Chief Executive, 
and in the restoration of a certain measure of Presidential power. 
Was Cleveland justified in withholding the information re-
lating to the suspensions? There seems to be no doubt whatever 
on this soore. In the first place, as the minority report men-
tioned, all the precedents cited by the majority of the Judiciary 
Committee, in which the President had handed over information to 
congress, involved business over which Congress had some power 
according to the Constitution, for example, treaty-making and 
appointment. Yet in this case, the Tenure of Offioe revision ot 
1869 clearly and completely reserved all power over removals and 
suspensions to the discretion ot the President alone. Thus 
Cleveland could hardly have surrendered the requested information 
and files without ettectually admitting that the Senate had a 
share in the removal power, which they most definitely did not 
have. Refusal of the information was essential to protect the 
powers of the President against Senatorial encroachment. 38 
In the second place, a pledge of secrecy had been given to 
the numerous advisors who had donated information. li"ailure to 
keep such a pledge would eventually have caused the desertion ot 
all the President's advisors, and greatly handicapped him in the 
administration of the government. 39 As both these motives for 
-
y 38Ernest J. Eberling, Con~e88ional Investigations, (New 
ork, 1928). 258. 
39Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 260 • 
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refusal were v.ery muoh for the publio welfare, and tiS oomplianoe 
would have been oontrary to the public welfare, Cleveland was 
fully Justified in his use of the power, for he followed strictly 
the preoedent set down by President George Washington. 
The two oases just oonsidered were undoubtedly the most im-
portant instanoes of a presidential refusal of information for 
the purpose of proteoting the prerogative of the Chief Executive. 
There were, however, three other oases of lesser importance, in 
which the same reason for withholding information was advanoed, 
but in whioh the President's right was less vehemently oontested. 
President Andrew Jaokson, who so successfully asserted the 
oonstitutional power ot the Executive in the oonflict with the 
Senate alr~ady considered, later found two more opportunities to 
assert this p.ower, one in 1835, and the other in 1831. His vic-
tory in 1834 must have thrown a pall over the other cases, at 
least so tar as Congress was oonoerned, for in comparison with 
that earlier C88e the later ones were quite tame. The seoond 
Jackson oase was preoipitated when an offiaial by the name of 
Gideon Fitz, who held the otfice of Surveyor-General South of the 
.tate of Tennes8ee, was removed from his poat by the President. 
On February 2, 1935, the Senate passed a resolution in whioh it 
requested the President to hand over oopies of the oharges whioh 
were communioated to Jaokson against F1tz, and which were re-
aponsible for Fitzts removal from office. The reasons given tor 
the request were that this information was neGesesar,. in order that 
-... 
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the Senate might know how to act concerning the appointment of a 
successor to Fitz, and as an aid to the investiga.tion it was then 
conducting into certain alleged frauds in the sale of public 
lands. 40 
The President replied on February 10, explaining that al-
though in the past he had frequently handed over information, in 
this Case he felt compelled to refuse. He considered that he 
would be failing in his duty of resisting encroachment on the 
rights of the Executive, since the in.formation in question was 
not of a more general type, but related exclusively to subjects 
falling under the jurisdiction of the Executive alone. Jackson 
also pOinted out that compliance with the resolution would ver'Y 
likely result in a Senate review of his removal ot Pitz, a right 
possessed by that body only when sitting as judges in a case of 
impeachment. And even it such a consequence did not result in 
this case, JaCkson still felt that compliance with this request 
might later be cited aa a precedent for later applications of a 
similar nature. The President concluded: 
I therefore decline a compliance with 80 much of 
the resolution of the Senate as requests tcopie. of the 
charges if any,' in relation to Mr. Fitz, and in doing 
10 must be distinctly understood a8 neither affirming nor 
denying that any such oharges were made; but as the Sen-
ate may lawfully call upon the President for information 
properly appertaining to nominations submitted to them, 
I have the honor, in this respeot, to reply that ! have 
none to giye them in the oase or the perlon nominated 
88 succe~sor to Mr. Fitz, except that I believe him, 
from sources entitled to the highest credit, to be 
well qualified in abilities and charapier to discharge 
the duties of the office in question. 4 
47 
An appropriate close to the administration of Andrew Jackson 
came with one of the most successful attempts of 8 President to 
resist a Congressional inquiry. On January 17, 1837, a special 
committee of the House was appointed to conduct an examination 
into the condition of certain executive departments. To aid the 
committee a series of resolutions was adopted on January 23, call-
ing on the President and heads ot departments tor certain informa-
tion. Especially outstanding was the following: 
Resolved that the President ot the United states be re-
quested and the heads of the several departments be 
directed to furnish this committee with a list, or lists, 
ot all officers or agents or deputies, who have been 
appointed or employed and paid since 4th of March 1829, 
to the first of December last (it any without authority 
of law) or whose names are not contained in the last 
printed register of public offices commonly called the 
Blue Boot by the President or either ot the said Heads 
of Depts. respectively; and without nomination to, or 
the advice and consent of the Senate ot the United states 
showing the names of such officers or agents or deputies; 
the SUMS paid each, the services rendered and by wha.t 
authority appointed and paid; and what reasons for such 
apPointments.42 
A copy of these resolutions was sent to President Jaokson 
by the committee. On January 27 Jaokson's reply was delivered 
by his secretary to Mr. Henry Wise of Virginia, Chairman of the 
l 
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42Register ot Debates in the United states Congress, 24th 
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committee. The message pointed out that the resolutions adopted 
by the House implied that there was reason to doubt the statement 
in his annual message that the executive departments were in good 
condition. The letter i8 such an excellent and forceful defense 
or Presidential prerogative that it merits quotation at least in 
part. Said Jackson: 
• • • according to the established rules of lew, you re-
request my self and the heads of departments to become 
our own accusers, and to furnish the evidence to convict 
ourselves; and this call purports to be founded on the 
authority of that body, in which alone by the Constitution, 
the power of impeachment is vested. The heeds of departments 
may anewer such requests as they please, provided they do 
not withdraw their own time and that of the officers under 
their direction, from the public business to the injury 
thereof ••• For myself, I shall repel all such attempts 
as an invasion of the prinCiples ot Justice, as well as 
of the Constitution; and I shall esteem it my sacred duty 
to the people of the United states to resist them as I 
would the establishment ot a Spanish Inquisition.43 
Chairman Wise was quite overwrought a.t this reply, and on 
January 30, he rose to otter a series of resolutions to the oom-
mittee. The President's letter, he said, was "an otficial attack 
on the proceedings of the House end of the committee." He then 
suggested thet the oommittee listen to a report by himselt on the 
correspondence exchanged with the President, and that measures be 
considered for the detense of the Housets proceedings and powers 
as well as those of its oommittees. However, the vote of the com-
mittee was negative, defeating Wise's resolutions six to three. 44 
-
43Ibld., XIII, Appendix, 202. 
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It was the view ot the majority of the committee members 
that the House did not have the power to call upon a party, much 
less upon the President of the United states, to incriminate 
itself. There were two reasons which justified an investigation, 
impeachment or legislation. Legislation they argued had to be 
ruled out as a motive, since the only defect that had been found 
in the laws was in their execution. Conaequently, they had no 
other choice but to oonsider this request as 8. preliminary in-
quiry ior the purpose of determining whether impeachment pro-
ceedings should be instituted or not. In such a case they felt 
that they could by no means construe their right to information 
as an unlimited power to call for persons or papers at their own 
arbitrary will. Such action would be a violation of that pro-
vision of the Constitution which states that the people have 8. 
right to security as to their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable search or seizure. The committee, 
therefore, decided that they did not have the right to demand all 
personal and private papers of public orficiala, and they con-
cluded that 80 far as this partiCUlar investigation was ooncerned 
there was no evidence that the executive departments had not been 
conducted with ability and integrity.45 
And so the matter was settled. Mr. Wise was quite dis-
satisfied with the committee's verdict, and claimed that there 
4.5Ibld., 137-8. 
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was a ditfere~c. between an inquisition, which was what Jackson 
termed the House's request, and an inquiry, which he thought the 
committee had a right and a duty to make. 46 This distinction may 
or may not have been valid. Nevertheless, Wise did overlook one 
very important tact which in subsequent cases was brought out 
explicitly, and that is that the right of the House or the Senate 
to make inquiries, whioh no one would dispute, does not pre-
suppose a oorresponding duty on the part of the President to 
comply with suoh inquiries. This was the first time the prinoi-
ple established by Washington in 1192, that oomplete discretion 
rests with the fresident, was attaoked. Jackson's victory on the 
point was final and oonclusive. 
A factor which should not be passed over, although it is ot 
minor importance, is that, as Wise pOinted out, Jackson con-
trolled the House. and, therefore, the committee too. This was 
indicated by the hasty and superfioial vind1cation they gave the 
President. Possibly the administration had a tew skeletons to 
hide. There can be no doubt that Jackson would have had a much 
harder fight against a House dominated by the opposition, and it 
there had been anything to hide, and were it serious enough, the 
President might have been hard pressed to avoid impeachment pro-
ceedings. This illustrates the intluence that party politics can 
have on the use and development of a power suoh as this. Of 
$1 
course, as the Cas. stands today, whether there were any skele-
tons or not, we do not know, nor was it ever proved. And 
Jacksonta assertion of his right not to teatify agaInst himselt 
certainly was valid, and very much in conformity with the publio 
interest. 
A rather amusing case occurred in 1876 when on April 3. the 
House requested President Ulysses S. Grant to inform it whether 
any executive offices, acts, or duties were within a certain 
period performed away trom tbe capital. It would seem that the 
8im ot this inquiry oould only have been to oause the President 
some embarrassment tor his lengthy summer sojourns at the Jersey 
Shore. Replied the President: ttl fail ••• to .find in the 
Constitution of the United states the authority given to the 
House of Representatives to requlre of the Exeoutive, an inde-
pendent branch ot the Government, coordinate with the Senate and 
House of Representatives, an aocount of his disoharge of his 
appropriate and purely executive offices, acts, and dutles. 61the 
88 to when, where, or how performed. "47 
Grant a180 went on to say that as the inf'ormat'l (" requested 
could have little to do with legislation, tho only other purpose 
could be in view of the Houae's power ot impeaohment. However, 
he reminded the House that no one can be t"orced to testify agains 
himself, not even the President. The act upon which the request 
-
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was based, he. said, related only to the establishment of the seat 
at govermrlent, and the provision 01" buildings and ortioes. Grant 
conoluded by enclosing a long list or precedents justirying his 
behavior. The preoedents inoluded numerous oases trom the ad-
ministrations of nearly all of his predecessors in whioh the 
fresident had oarried on exeout1ve bus1ness away rrom the seat 
of government.48 Hia letter left little doubt either of the 
correotness of his refusal or of his long-established praotioe ot 
maintaining a t' sUllIIlJer Whl te Bouse. Jt 
-
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE rOWER - I I 
Besides the 08ses already mentioned in whioh the f:resident's 
refusal ot into:rmation was prompted by the neoessity ot defending 
the prerogative of the Executive against encroaohrrlent, there were 
elso many cases in which oertain more speoifie issues were at 
stake. For instanoe, one of the reasons most rreQuently resorted 
to in recent tl~. has been the President's feeling of obligation 
toward the individual, or toward the private citizen, or toward 
persons whose constitutional right ot a public t:rial ot jury 
seemed in danger of violation. In this conneotion, the following 
four cases provide excellent preoedents for the act10ns of modern 
Chief Exeoutive •• 
Late in 1806, the nation val deeply conoerned over the Burr 
Conspiracy, and Jerferson's seeming laxity in handling the affair. 
The President ment10ned the subject in his annual message to Con-
gress in December, 1806, but his fa1lure to mention any names 
Caused Congressman John Randolph to intDoduce the following reso-
lution into the House of Representatlves on January 16: 
Resolved, that the President of the United states be, 
and he hereby is, requested to lay before this House 
any information 1n poss8ssion of the Executive, except 
such as he may deem the public weltare to require not 
53 
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to be di_closed, touching any illegal combination ot 
private individuals against the peaoe and satety of the 
Union, or any military expedition planned by suoh in-
dividuals against the territories of any Fower in amity 
with the United states; together with the meS.8ures whioh 
the Executive haa pursued and proPfses to take for 
suppressing or deteating the S8me. 
The resolution was overwhelmingly passed. 
AccordinglY', on January 22, the President replied in a mess-
sge to the Senate and the Hou.e, 8ull'.llIlarizlng the detalls of the 
oonspiraoy as related to him by dispatohes trom General Wilkinson 
and other souroe.. However, he retused to give any names other 
than that of Aaron Burr. Said the President: 
The mass ot what I have reoeived in the oourse ot the •• 
transaotions 18 voluminous, but little haa been given 
under the sanction ot an oath so a8 to constitute formal 
and legal evidenoe. It is ohietly in the torm ot letters, 
otten oontainlng such a mixture of rumors, oonJectures, 
and suspicions 8S renders it diffioult to sift out the 
real taots and unadvi.able to hazard more than general 
outlines, strengthened by oonourrent information or the 
partloular oredibility or the relator. In thi. state 
of the ev1dence, delivered 8ometime., too, under the 
re8tl'iction ot private oonfidence, neither aatetr nor justIce will permit the exposing names, except that of 
the pr1nc~pal actor, who.e guilt ia placed beyond 
question. 
Of Jefrerson's rerusal to give names, Schaahner blandly 
states: uHis delio8.cy was doubtless motivated by the considera-
tion that had he ylelded all the names, '·hey would have inoluded 
such men a8 Senators Breckinrldge and Smith, General Andrew 
-
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Jackson and Go.vernor William Henry Harrison, as well as Wilkinson 
himself, with explosive personal and political connotations.") 
It is not too difficult to understand how such notable personages 
e8 these might have been involved, tor Jefferson mentions,4 and 
Schachner admits,S that Burr managed to seduce many well meaning 
citizens into believing he had the support of the Government in 
bls mysteloicU3 enterprise. Nor would it be too surprising it 
Jefferson wished to keep this information secret. Yet, Schachner 
seems to imply that this was his only reason for withholding the 
nemes. Such a charge, the truth ot which is by no means selt-
evident, seems to call for more proof than Schachner gives, and 
until such proof is forthcoming, it seems reasonable to accept 
Jefferson's own explanation of his refusal at its face value. 
A similar case ocourred during the administration of Pres-
ident James Monroe, although the issue did not conoern the value 
of the evidence involved. On January 4, 1825, the House of 
Representatives passed a resolution requesting President Monroe 
to hand over a number ot documents relating to the conduot of 
certain American naval officers serving in the Pacific, and of 
ertain government agents in South America. 6 Some of the charges 
3Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, (New York, 1951), II, 8 
4Messages .!E2. Papers .2! 2 Presidents, I, 402. 
5Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 8)1. 
6con,res8ional Record, 69th Congress, 1st Session, (Washing-
1'126 , 4548. 
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made against the principal naval officer, one Commodore stewart, 
were sent to Washington by the American ambassador to ~eru, a 
Mr. frevost. The ambassador was in turn the subject of accusationl 
made by others in South America. Monroe suspended the Commodore 
from duty pendIng the trial and summoned him, together with Mr. 
Prevost, to Washington for a showdown. 7 What the documents re-
quested by the House contained is not clear. On January 10, the 
President answered the request as tollows: 
In this stage the publication of those documents 
might tend to excite prejudices which might operate to 
the injury ot both •••• It is due to their [the accused] 
rights and to the character of the Government that they 
be not censured without Just cause, which cannot be as-
certained until, on a view ot the charges, they are heard 
in their detens., and arter a thorough and impartial in-
vestigation ot their conduct. Under these circumstances 
it is thought that a communication at this time ot those 
documents would not comport with the publi~ interest nor 
with what is due to the parties concerned. 
fresident Andrew Jackson's refusal in 1835 to communicate 
the charges made ags.inst the otticial conduct of Gideon Pi tz, 
one-time Surveyor-General of Tennessee, has already been treated 
at length. The case deserves mention again at this point, for 
beSides his fears at Senatorial encroachment on the powers at the 
ax.cutiv., Jackson also cited as a reason tor refusing the intor-
.. tion the tact that fl ••• the citi~en whose conduct is impeached 
-
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[Mr. Fita] would lose one of his valuable securitIes, that whIch 
is afforded by a public investigation 1n the presence ot hi. 
accusera and of the wItnesses against hlm.n9 
A Oase very a1milar to the one whIch occurred durIng Jeffer-
son'a admInIstration took place under President Tyler. On May 18, 
1842, the House requested-trom the Seoretary ot War cop1es or 
certa1n reports made to the War Department, which dealt with the 
affairs or the Cherokee Indians, and with oertain injustices whioh 
had been perpetrated against them, together with all the tact. in 
possession ot the Executive relating to the SUbject. After con-
sultation with the fre.ident, the Seoretary at War informed the 
House that linoe negotiations tor the settlement ot IndIan claims 
were at that time well under way, it was the opinion ot the 1>re8· 
i Ident and the War DepartR8nt that pub11cation ot the report would 
b. lnconsiatent with the publio interest. FUrthermore, sa1d the 
Secretary, the report oonta1ned information of questionable value, 
obtained without the sanct10n ot an oath, and which the persons 
1ap11oated had had no opportunity to deny or explain. Promulga-
t10n ot suoh informatIon would, thererore, be a gros8 injustice to 
tbe persons involved, espeCially aince the Department had not yet 
an opportunity ot calling upon the interested parties tor 
9Mels!ies ~ Papers 2! ~ Presidents, III, 1)$2. 
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This answer was not satisfactory to the House Committee on 
Indian Affairs, which felt that it had a right to any information 
dealing with subjeots of House deliberation. 10 Accordingly, on 
January 31, President Tyler himself replied in a lengthy letter 
to the House. He agreed to surrender much of the information re-
quested and previously refused, since negotiations were by that 
time completed. However, he flatly denied that the President was 
obliged to give information to the House simply because it con-
cerned a subject of House deliberation. Moreover, concerning the 
persons involved, Tyler again withheld all information, since h. 
felt it would be an injustice to them to release it. 
Another reason for his refusal which had not been fully 
developed in the earlier letter was also treated here. This con-
cerned the President's obligation to the Army officer who had made 
the report, one Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcook. Said Tyler: 
The officer charged with a confidential inquiry, and 
who reports its result under the pledge of confidence 
which his aPPOintment implies, ought not to be exposed 
individually to the resentment of those whose conduct 
may be impugned by the information he oollects. The 
knowledge that such is to be the consequence will in-
evi tabl,. prevent the pertormance of duties of" tbs.t 
character, and thus the Government will be deprived 
of an imporrfnt means of investigating the conduct of 
its agents. 
All four of these cases contain refusals of information 
prompted by the President's duty to respect the rights of the 
lOCongresslonal Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 6265. 
llMessases ~ Papers £! ~ Presidents, V, 2076. 
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individual. ~e cases arising under Presidents Jerrerson and 
Tyler are remarkably similar because the emphasis is plaoed on the 
questionable character or the inrormation which might be used as 
evidenoe against some individual. In the Cases under Monroe and 
Jackson, it is more a question or proteoting the oitizents oon-
stitutional right to a publio trial by jury, in the presenoe of 
witnesses. It is not diffioult to see why the reasons alleged in 
all tour ot' these cases might easily be construed as 8 proteotion 
of the public interest, since any proteotion or constitutional 
rights is to the advantage of the public. The precedents set in 
these four cases have undoubtedly been the most frequently used in 
recent times, as will later be shown. 
In three instances presidents have been known to refuse in-
formation on the grounds that it was "confidential." The first 
of these cases occurred toward the end of President Theodore 
Roosevelt's second administration. In 1907, the United States 
Steel CorporatIon purohased the most important iron and steel 
conoern in the South, the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company. This 
famous transaction, which supposedly alleviated the Panic of 1907, 
Was made possible by the President's statement that he did not see 
fit to "lnterpose any objections." A resolution was passed in the 
Senate EI ysar or so later directing the Senate Judiciary Committee 
to determine and report as to whether the Presidentts action con-
stituted a violation or the Sherman Anti Trust Law. To aid the 
h 
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committee's e.tforts, anothett resolution was passed directing the 
Attorney Genettal to turnish the committee with answers to the 
following two questions: 1. Whether legal proceedings were in-
stituted against the United states Steel Corporation tor its 
absorption ot Tennessee Ooal and Iron Company in 1907, and it not, 
why not? 2. Whether an opinion was rendered concerning the legal-
ity of such absorption, and it so, what was it?12 
The request of the Senate was referred to the ITesident and 
on January 6, 1909, Mr. Roosevelt replied as tollows: 
Atter sending this letter [to the Attorney General, Novem-
ber 4, 1907, advising him ot his action] 1 was advised 
orally by the Attottney General that, in his opinion, no 
suffIcient gttounds existed for legal proceedings against 
the Steel Corporation, and that the situation had been 
in no way changed by its acquisition of the Tennessee 
Coal and Itton Company. 
I have thus given to the Senate all the inrormation 
in the posses81on of the Exeoutive Department whioh 
appears to me to be material or relevant, on the subjec~ 
or the resolution. I teel bound, however, to add that I 
have instructed the Attorney General not to respond to 
that port10n ot tbe resolution which calls tor a state-
ment or his reasona for nonaotion. I have done 80 
because I do not oonceive it to be within the authottity 
of the Senate to give directions ot this charaoter to 
the head ot an execut1ve department, or to demand from 
hIm reasons tor his aotion. Heads ot exeoutive depart-
ments are subject to the ConstitutIon and to the lawa 
passed by the Congress in pUttsuance of the Oonstitution, 
and to the direct10ns ot the President of t~. United 
states, but to no other direction whatever. J 
12consre.llonal Record, 60th Congress, 2nd Se8sion, 527-8. 
13Ibld. 
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When the Senate found that it could not obtain the desired 
. 
papers from the Attorney General, it summoned Herbert Knox Smith, 
head of the Bureau of Corporations, and ordered him to hand over 
all the papers he had in his office on the subject. Smith went to 
the President and explained that most of the papers in question 
had been secured in a confidential manner, and that grave trouble 
would certainly result from their publication. Roosevelt told 
Smith to secure a decision from the Attorney General·s office that 
the papers should not be made public, but the Senate Committee 
retaliated by threatening Smith with imprisonment for contempt it 
he did not transmit the papers at once. nAs soon as he reported 
this to me," said Roosevelt, ttl ordered him In writing to turn 
over to me all the papers in the case, 80 that I could assist the 
Senate in the prosecution of its Investigatlon. tl14 
Roosevelt immediately saw Senator Clark, Chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee, and informing him of this action, "[1] told 
him," he said, "they would not be given to the Senate, that I 
could not be forced to give them, and I did not see why they shoul 
make any effort to get them unleS8 they were prepared to go to the 
length of trying to have me impeached. This called tor a show-
down and I rather doubt it they will press their point, altho they 
a.re so foolish that I am not certain on the subject. ltlS 
14Th. Letters of Archie Butt, ad. Lawrence F. Abbott, 
(Gardenl[fty, 1924);-No. 75, ~ 
lSThe Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting E. Morison, 
(Cambridge, Mass., ~5~), No. 5131, 148i. 
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Clark th~n assured the President that the Senate was merely 
anxious to protect its own prerogative, and that the Committee 
was most willing to submit to his point or view, if he felt the 
papers should not be made public. Roosevelt nonetheless re-
mained wary and oontinued to hold the papers beoause, as he put 
it: "Some of these faots which they want, for what purpose 1 
hardly know, were given to the Government under the seal or 
seoreoy and oannot be divulged, and 1 will see to it that the word 
of this Government to the individual is kept sacred."16 
As to the legality or Roosevelt's dealings with the United 
states Steel Corporation, the Senate subcommittee could arrive 
at no agreement. While the opposition felt he had no authority 
to permit the absorption of the Tennessee Company, Republicans 
in the committee and in Congress simply maintained that the ques-
tion was irrelevant, since Roosevelt did not authorize the trans-
aotion, but merely said that he would not "interpose any 
objeotion •• nI7 
Years later, the Stanley Committee of the House undertook 
another investigation of this famous business deal, but efforts 
towards a detinite oonolusion were no more suooessful. During 
the hearings, oompetent witnesses under oath flatly contradioted 
one another, and were themselves oontradioted by subsequent 
16Letters or Archie Butt, 306. 
------~ -- ----
17Letters 2! Theodore Roosevelt, 1481. 
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witnesses. Th~ worst that could be agreed upon, and that only by 
a majority of the committee, was that certain tacts had been mis-
represented to the President by the representatives of the steel 
Corporation, and that the President had acted "hastily and un-
wisely. "18 
NOW, when a President retuses information to a subcommittee, 
which 1s seek1ng to determine whether he acted legally or not 1n 
a part1cular instance, certain suspicions might naturally be 
aroused. SUch a refusal might, ot course, be an outright abuse ot 
the power to withhold intormation, since in that Case the Fres-
ident would not be protecting the public interest but rather his 
own personal interest, and that 1n a fraudulent manner. Moreover, 
there are not lacking those who feel that the old Roughrider was 
capable ot just such an abuse, and who would not hesitate to argue 
~ priori that Roosevelt must have been guilty. This, of course, 
remains to be proved, and in the opinion of students of the sub-
ject never will be proved conclusively, due to the confusion ot 
the testimony given. l9 The whole tone of his correspondence on 
the subject, both public and priVate, at least shows us that if 
Roosevelt had anything to hide, that is, if he was in any way 
guilty of illegal action, he certainly was not aware of it. 
l8Henry R. Seager and Charles Gulick, Jr., Trust ~ 
Corporation Problems, (New York, 1929), 230-235. 
19i1l!!., 235. 
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And since it ~annot be proved that his action was culpable, the 
reason he actually gave for refusing the information, namely to 
protect the sacred word of the United states Government to the 
individual, ougbt to be accepted as Roosevelt's real and sincere 
reason for the refusal. 
Another case of the refusal of confidential information took 
place when a special Senate investigating co~ttee was appointed 
on March 12, 1924, to look into the proceedings of the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue. A request was made of the Secretary ot the 
Treasury tor a list of the companies whose tax returns he was 
"0 
alleged to be investigating.~ 
President Coolidge considered the Senate's action to be an 
unwarranted intrusion into the proceedinga ot the Executive De-
partment. He said: "Whatever may be necessary for the informa-
tion of, the Senate or any of its oommittees in order to better 
enable them to perform their legislative or other constitutional 
functions ought alwaya to be furnished willingly and expeditiously 
by any department. But it ia recognized both by law and custom 
that there is certain oonfidential information which it would be 
detrimental to the public service to reveal. tt21 
A similar Case oocurred in 1932 when the House requested all 
documents pertaining to a Treasury Department investigation of the 
20Ernest J. Eberling, Congressional Investigations, (New 
York, 1928), 277. 
21Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st Session, 6087. 
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importation ~f ammonium sulphate. The request was refused by 
secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills who said: "It has been the 
practice of the Department in acting under this statute to treat 
all information turnished by interested persons as confidential 
and not to disclose it unless such persons consent to the dis-
clo.ure • • • • As consent has not been given to the disclosure 
of the information contained in the record before the Treasury 
Department, I am of the opinion that it would be incompatible 
with the public interest to comply with the request contained in 
the resolution. n22 ~he letter was received by the Houae without 
comment. 
The only wartime exeroise of the power came at the outset of 
the Civil War, when the Senate on March 25, 1861, requested Pres-
ident Lincoln to transmit oertain dispatches sent to the War De-
partment by Major Robert Anderson, commanding officer at Fort 
Sumter. The dispatches contained such top secret information as 
the detail's food supply and the position and strength of enemy 
forces as well as of the Union torces. 23 
On the following d87, the President replied that he had ex-
amined the oorrespondence, and concluded his letter by saying 
that he had, "with the highest respect for the senate, come to 
22Ibid., 72nd Congress, 1st Session, 11669 • 
........... 
23Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, the War Years, (New York, 
1940), I, 188. --- ---
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the conclusio~ that at the present moment the publication or it 
would be inexpedient.,,24 
In 1930, for the ~irst time since Washington's use of the 
power in 1796, information was withheld concerning the negotia-
tions of a treaty. When the London Naval Treaty was submitted 
to the Senate for ratification early in July; 1930, the Committee 
on Foreign Relations requested from Secretary of state Stimson all 
papers concerned with the negotiations prior to and during the 
London Conrerence. Some of these documents were handed over, but 
the Secretary explained that he had been directed by the President 
to refuse certain others, the disclosure of which would not be 
compatible with the public interest. The Foreign Relations Com-
mittee was indignant at this treatment, and pressed its right to 
have tree and full acceS8 to the papers. A resolution was adopted 
which asserted tha.t the documents were fire levant and pertinent 
when the Senate is considering a treaty for the purpose ot 
ratiticatlon."25 
This resolution prompted Stimson to write a short note to the 
Senate, simply restating hlapp;evlous stand. Congress adjourned 
early in July, 1930, but President Hoover Immediately ca.lled back 
the Senate to consider the treaty. After three days of the spe-
cial sesslon, a resolution was passed by a vote ot fifty-three to 
24Message. ~ Papers £! ~ Presidents, VII, 3213. 
25Congreaslonal Record, 71at Congress, 2nd Sesslon, 12030. 
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four, request~ng the President to submit to the Senate all the 
documents relating to the treaty, if not incompatible with the 
public interest, together with whatever recommendations he might 
see fit concerning their use. 26 
The President replied on the following day, pointing out that 
the number of informal reports and statements given to the Govern-
ment in confidence was very great. The President, he said, had an 
obligation to keep secret all the negotiations of a treaty, accord-
ing to the time-honored custom among nations, in order to preserve 
friendly relations with other countries. Hoover was sure that the 
Senate would not care to have him violate such a trust, whioh is 
the invariable practice ot nations. He concluded: "In view of 
this, I believe that to further oomply with the above resolution 
would be incompatible with the public interest.,,27 
A heated debate followed, for the senate was far from satia-
fied with this reply of the President. Finally, Senator Norris 
proposed a resolution calculated to save the Senate's face, Whioh 
allowed the treaty to be ratified, but with the olear and explioit 
understanding that there were no secret papers or agreements tend-
ing to mOdify the terms of the treaty. This measure, together 
26Nelson MCGeary, ~ DeVelO~ment of conff:esaional 
Investigative Power, (New York, l~o), I03-1o~ 
27Senate Dooument No. 216, 71st Congress, speoial Session 2. 
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with the President's willingness to make the concession of allow-
ing certain key senators to see the papers, secured the ratif1ca-
tion of the treaty. On July 21, it was finally passed by a vote 
28 of fifty-eight to nine. 
28McGeary, !h! Development 2t Congressional Investigative 
Power, 104. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Very little need be said at this pOint on the origin of the 
power, as that has been sufficiently treated In Chapter II. 
Though the power was not actually exercised until 1796 in connec-
tion with the Jay Treaty, the principles on which it rests were 
established with President Washington's interpretation of the 
constitutional dootrine of separatIon of powers in 1792. Aooord-
ing to Washington and his cabInet, who foresaw that the deoision 
they made would serve as a preoedent, four principles were set 
down. Their conclusIons were that: 
••• (1). the House was an inquest, and, therefore, might 
instItute inquiries. (2). that they might call for papers 
generally. (3). that the Executive ought to communicate 
such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to 
retuse those the disclosure ot which would injure the 
public. Consequent17,were to exercise a discretion. (4). 
that neither the co~e nor House had a right to call on 
the head ot a deptmt, who and whose papers were under the 
Presidt. a.lone, but that the oommee should instruot their 
ohairman to move the house to address the PresIdent. 
Careful study or the development of the power reveals that 
in the 164 years of Its existence the norm set down by WashIngton 
of compatibIlIty with the public Interest has been interpreted 
1 Jefferson, writinsa, II, 213-14. 
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in tive ditterent ways, or to put it ditferently, the precedents 
. 
examined group themselves in tive ditferent categories. While it 
is true that theoretically any President could introduce new 
grounds for refusal by a new interpretation of what is demanded 
by the public interest, nevertheless, the tact remains that pres-
idents have been much more ready to tollow precedents already 
established, than to set new ones themselvea. The last real in-
novation in the power dates back to Lincoln's administration. 
This tact, together with the reverence for tradition retlected in 
numerous letters of Presidents and Attorneys-General citing prece-
dents to justify their own actions, plus the apparent adequacy of 
the power as it exists today, make innovation much less likely thM 
it was one hundred or more years ago. These tive categories repr&-
sent, then, the practical limitations ot the power as i~ &as da-
veloped over the years and as it exists today. It might be help-
ful to recall them briefly_ 
A frequent justitication of refusals has been to protect the 
powers ot the Chiet Executive against congressional encroachment. 
Thus the President may be detending his right to consult privately 
and in contidence with a cabinet advisor, as did Jackson in 1833. 
Or he may be protecting a particular power, such as the power to 
remove otticials trom ottice, which Cleveland upheld in 1886. Or 
his refusal may be based simply on the constitutional right pos-
sessed by every citizen to retuse to testity against himself. 
Such were the refusals of Jackson in 1837 and Grant in 1876. 
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Another ~eason which has been advanced quite otten, espe~ 
oia11y in reoent years has been that the requested information 
constItuted what in modern times has come to be known as "un-
evaluated evidence." It will, no doubt, come as a surprise to 
some to learn that the numerous refUsals of F.B.I. and state 
Department tiles to congressional committees during the Truman 
Administration were well-founded in historic~l precedent. The 
earliest Case of this type may be traced as far back as the 
Jetferson administration, when in 1801 the President re!used to 
tl:'anami t to the House evidence "containing such a mixture o! 
.rumora, conjectures, and suspicions as renders it difficult to 
sift out the real facts."2 Closely resembling this ca.se were 
the two cases which occurred in the administrations ot Presidents 
Monroe and Jackson (1835). Although the point at issue was not 
the character at the evidence, the principle involved was none-
thele.a the same, namely the protection ot the rights of the in-
dividual Citizen. 
A third type of refuaal was the cry ot "confidential infor-
mat1ont! resorted to by Theodc;re Roosevelt, and after him by 
Presidents Coolidge and Hoover. The development of the power 
along this line is particularly interesting. Prior to Mr. 
Roosevelt's refusal, no preaident had. ever put off a congression-
al request with such an air of casualness, and few with such 
2Me88ases ~ Papers 2f ~ Fresidents, I, 400. 
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sel1'-assurana, as these cases exhibIt. Even Roosevelt went at 
least so 1'ar as to explain that his action was prompted by his 
concern that the "word or this Government to the individual be 
kept sacred.") Yet no such explanation accompanited the retusals 
under Ooolidge in 1924 and Hoover in 1932, and in the latter aase 
the Souse did not even see rit to comment on, much leas objeot to 
the re1'usal, a good illustration of the strength the power had 
gained by that time. 
There was only one case or a retusal of in1'ormation 1'or 
reasons 01' wartime security, that which took place early in the 
administration or ~re8ident Abraham Lincoln. 
As for treaties with foreign powers and the seorecy usually 
attendant on such negotiations, there were but two instances 01' 
such a refusal. The first, whioh ocourred in 1796 during Wash-
ing'on's disagreement with the House over the Jay Treaty, was 
also the first time the power was ever exeroised under any oir-
oumstances. The only other incident or this type did not take 
plaoe until the administration of President Herbert Hoover in 
1930. Nevertheless, a striking development did take place within 
this sphere ot usage. Washington, it will be reoalled, refused 
information to the House, which, as he stated at the time, does 
not share in the treaty-makIng power. Yet his letter indioates 
that just as he had surrendered all requested information, even 
3Letters !! Archie ~. 306. 
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secret, to the Senate at the time ot its deliberation, so too 
would he have granted the request of the Rouse, had that body also 
shared in the power over treatiea.4 However, President Hoover did 
not hesitate to refuse even the Senate in his exercise of the pow-
er 134 years later, a faot indioative of the growth ot the power 
both within the sphere ot treaty negotiations. as well as in 
general. 
These then are the five oategories whioh show the bounds ot 
the ¥resident's power to withhold information from Congress: 
protectlon of the oonstitutional powers of the President against 
congressional encroachment; protection ot the individual's right 
to a fair trial by jurYJ confidential information; wartime 
security, treaty secrecy. 
Consideration should be given to one other aspect of the 
power's development, and that concerns its extension to the heads 
of Executive Departments. It was the mind ot President W.ahing-
ton, as well as of hi. cabinet, that Congress neither could nor 
should attempt to compel an executive otficial. All requests were 
to be directed to the President, who would then decide what should 
be done by his lesser otficials.S Indeed, Secretary of War Knox 
did appear before a congressional committee in 1792, but this 
action was purely voluntary. 
z 
4Messases ~ Papers ~ ~ Presidents, I, 186-88. 
5Jefferaon, Writ1ngs, II, 213-14. 
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Neverthe~ess, the House resolution adopted in 1837 boldly 
stated: "Resolved that the President of the United states be re-
quested and heads of the several departments ~ directed to fur-
nish this committee with a list, etc •••• ,.6 Although President 
Jackson's reply allowed department heads to choose their own 
course, it indicated that he would back up a refusal on their par~ 
and the caS8 ended in a victory for the President before the issue 
of department heads could deTelop much further. 
Ho other refusals of information involved executive officers 
other than the President until 1886, when the Senate concentrated 
exclusively upon cabinet officers and espeCially on the Attorney 
General in its requests. President Grover Cleveland, it will be 
recalled, was convinced that the Senate was trying to control 
these heads of executive departments against the President, even 
in executive matters. Accordingly, he vigorously denied the 
Senatets right to such a power and assumed all responsibility for 
refusals made by lesser executive officials. 
Yet the steadfast insistence ot Jackson and Cleveland on the 
dependence of executive otticials on the President in this matter, 
was not enough to establish the principle, for twenty years later 
witnessed one of the most tlagrant attempts on the part of Congress 
to force information from an executive official. When the Senate 
in 1909 directed the Attorney Gener_l to transmit certain 
6Resister of Debates in the United States Oongress, 24th 
Oongress, 2nd Session, XIII, Appendix, 199. 
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intormation, ~e slmply referred the demand to ~resident Theodore 
~ooa.velt who replied 1n worda that have slnce become famous: 
"Heads ot executIve departments are subject to the Constitution 
end to the laws passed by the Congress in pursuance of the Consti-
tut10n, and to the directions ot the i'resident or the United state. 
fbut to no other direction whatever. n7 '!'he Senate then summoned 
another executive orrioial or lesser stature, the Head of the Bur-
eau or Oorporations, and threatened him with Imprisonment tor 
contempt it he refused to hand over certain papera. Roosevelt met 
this challenge by taking personal possessIon ot all tbe des1red 
papers and then makIng the refusal himae1t. With this the Senate 
backed down, and the .oat serIous effort to torce intormation from 
department heads was deteated. Congress bas never, either prior 
or sub.equant to this Incident, successfully subpoened a depart-
ment head, nor held one to be in oontempt. 8 This was the closest 
they 8ver came to it, and the1~ failure at this time marks the 
turning pOint in the battle over department heada. 
An epilogue came in 1932 when Secretary ot the Treasury 
~ Mills refused oertain conEidential information to the House. 
~15 Oase is intereating for it shows the eompleteness ot the 
President's victol7'. The reason given by Mills W8.S vague and 
briet; the oErieisl involved was one over whom past Congresses had 
7Conspe.8ional Reeots, 60th Congress, 2nd Seasion, 527-8. 
8Rdward s. Corwin. The rresident, Office and Powe~., (New 
.......... . ______ 'II. 
York, 1941), 1)9. 
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felt ~hey had. a rather unique power, the Secretary of the Treasur~ 
Nevertheless, the refusal was received without a single comment or 
objection on the part of the House. Since that time, no one has 
disputed the tact tha.t 1n matters of requested 1nformation, de-
partment heads are identical w1th and hold the same power as the 
President, as long as the Chief Execut1ve chooses to back them up. 
The pr1ncipal, and possibly the only, disadvantage of the 
President's power of refusal lies in the tact that the final de-
cision as to whether the information in question would be compati-
ble with the public interest rests with the President alone. Even 
it he is the person best qualified to determine this, it is im-
mediately evident that such a provision does open the door to a 
certain amount of abuse. For example, such an abuse would occur 
if the President were to retuse information in order to hide a 
certain fraud within the Executive Department. In that case, he 
m1ght avow that his refusal waa d1ctated by a regard for the 
publio interest. Indeed 1t would be, as a protection ot rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. But would not revelation of 
the fraud be of greater immediate value to the nation's welfare? 
This disadvantage is obvious t'rorn an examination of the very 
nature of the power. Yet 1n the analysis we have conducted of the 
various historical cases, no evidence of such an abuse has been 
detected. In all the cases considered there are but two which 
might arouse a few suspicions, the Jackson case of 1837, and that 
under Theodore Roosevelt in 1909. However, as already pointed out 
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in the treatment of those case., no abuse could be proved, and 8. 
the reasons for refusing the information were otberwise perfectly 
in aoool'd with the principles laid down by Washington. the only 
course i& to aocept them a& they stand. 
This disadvantage of the power 18 undoubtedl,. otfset to a 
certain degree by congress1onal power over legislation and appro-
pr1ations. Washington's second case or 1796 has given us an ex-
cellent illustration of the pressure which the lIouse oan exert 
upon a president. Then too, thel'e is public opinion, whioh may be 
stIrred up by Congress or by the rress. In the Teapot Dome scan-
dal ot 1924, Attorn.,. General Harry M. Daugherty requested the sid 
ot ~resident Coolidge 1n denling certain information to the oon-
~e8alonal investigating commIttee. The fre.ident very wisely 
refused this favor on the grounds that he could hardly rely on the 
Attorney General'. word a. to what papers should be refused, aince 
Daughepty was not in a posItion to otter dislntel'ested advice. 
CoolIdge Bolved the problem by requesting Daugherty'. resignation, 
and by followIng the advice ot his sucoessor.9 Had the Fresident 
attempted to support his Attorney General, who was later convicted 
or fraud, Congres8 would certainly have probed all around the 
s1tuatIon, raising a great deal ot suspicion in the public mind, 
and eventually provating seriou. polItical difficultie. tor the 
Exeoutive. 
9Copsre •• lonal Reoord, 84th Oongress, 2nd seaalon. 9879. 
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On the other side ot the ledger, there are a number ot dis-
tinot advantages to be found in this exeoutive power. froteotion 
ot the President's legitimate constitutional powers must always 
b. considered an advantage ot great value under a government suoh 
as ours. So muoh depends on secrecy 1n time ot war, both in lives 
and materials, that it is olearly an advantage tor the Commander-
in-Chief to have the power ot enforcing wartime security. It 
would be a great handicap indeed if the fresident were torced to 
reveal every piece of information, even the most confidential, to 
congressional investigatIng oommittees. As for the secreoy in-
volved in the negotiation ot a treaty, a great deal dependa on 
Just what is kept secret, but 8S this 1s a procedure absolutely 
essential and neceasarT for the oonclusion of an agreement with a 
foreign power, it must be oonoeded that there is some advantage in 
the ¥residentts maintenance ot it. 
Always an important consideration, and just a& much at an 
advantage today 8S ever, is the confidential relation between the 
rresident and his advisers. Three presidents mentioned this 8S 
at le~u.t a secondary reason tor their refusals ot information, 
Jackson in 1833, Cleveland, and Tyler. Yet this confidential re-
lationship would not last long 1t Congress had the pover to de-
mand an account of the advice given by an adviser. For advisers 
will aoon cease to be of any value it they oannot be guaranteed 
that what they sayar write will be held 1n oonfidence; "that the 
man or the oftice they advise w111 appreCiate the fact that they 
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are expressing opinions and that, probably, they are not the only 
one. asked for opinions and advice. The minute an effort 1. made 
• • • to determine wbether the opin1ons or the advioe on which a 
decision waa made was 'right', (with retribution and oritioism 
tor those wbo were not 'right') independent thought whioh alone 
produoe. sound decisions will be stymied or kl1led. u10 
The last advantageot the power and undoubtedly the fIOst im-
portant today, tor Just about every recent case of refusal haa 
been.for this re.son, 1s the protection it enable. the President 
to give to the individual from oongress1onal investigating com-
mitte... The efforts ot these oommittees to remove subver.ive 
el.ments trom the Government are certainly deserving ot praise, 
but it haB happened that, througb an excess of zeal and possibly 
a certa1n amount of thoughtlessness, oommittees have sought tiles 
and information from various exeout1ve d.epaI'tments whioh contained 
large amount. ot nun.valuated evidence." This term was explained 
by Attorney General Robert Jaokson 1n 1941 and again by Mr. J. 
Edgar Hoover, Director ot the F'ederal Bureau or Investigat10n 1n 
1950. Said Jackson ot such F.B. I. tiles: uDisclosure or informa-
tion oontained in the reports might 81so be the grossest kind ot 
injustice to innooent individuals. Investigative reports inolude 
lOHar17 S. Truman, M.emoirs, Vol. II: 
Hope, (Garden City, 1956), 454. Years of Trial and _. ....... ............ 
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leads and suspicions, and aometimes even the statementa of 
malicious or misinformed people."ll This statement, and another 
made by fr.aident Truman in which he expressed the spirit of the 
Loyalty Program inaugurated 1n 1947 as suoh that "rUlllOr" gossip, 
or susp1cion will not be 8urricient to lead to the dismissal of 
any employe. tor disloyalty,n12 are strikingly reminiscent of the 
words or '!'homas Jet.terson in 1807. We recall hi,ls> refusal to hand 
over to the House certain information because it contained "SUCh 
a m1xture of rumors, conjectures, end suspicions 8S renders it 
difficult to s1tt out the real racts."l) This protect1on ot' the 
constitut1onal rights of the indiv1dual has become one of the out-
standing advantages ot the President fS power to refuse in,formation 
In oonclusion, we should like to point out onoe more that 
this theais is not intended 8S a treatment of the legal aspects 
of the problem. Neither does it propose any alteration of the 
fresident's power to refuse information to Congress, 88 that power 
exists today. for this belongs to the realm of politioal science. 
It is merely an historical treatment of certain precedents which 
llAlan Barth, ~ LoXa1tl 2! !£!!~, (New York, 1951) 159. 
1211athaniel Weyl, ~ Battle Aiainat Disloyaltz, (Hew York, 
1951), 187. 
1)Me8Sagea !!!S. Papers 2!. !!:!!. Presidents, I, ltOo. 
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have occurred" in history. made with a view to deterll'lining the 
origin of the power. the developll~ent of the power up to the 
present til". and the advantages and dleadvantages in that power 
8S history presents them. 
----------------------..... .-.-
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